Performance Tradeoff in a Unified System of Communications and Passive
  Radar: A Secrecy Capacity Approach by Chalise, Batu K. & Amin, Moeness G.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
09
52
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
0 A
ug
 20
18
Performance Tradeoff in a Unified System of Communications and
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Batu K. Chalise and Moeness G. Amin
Abstract
In a unified system of passive radar and communication systems of joint transmitter plat-
form, information intended for a communication receiver may be eavesdropped by a passive
radar receiver (RR), thereby undermining the security of communications system. To min-
imize this information security risk, in this paper, we propose a unified passive radar and
communications system wherein the signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) at the RR
is maximized while ensuring that the information secrecy rate is above a certain threshold
value. We consider both scenarios wherein transmissions of the radar waveform and informa-
tion signals are scheduled with the disjoint (non-overlapping case) as well as with the same
set of resources (overlapping case). In both cases, the underlying optimization problems are
non-convex. In the former case, we propose alternating optimization (AO) techniques that
employ semidefinite programming and computationally efficient semi-analytical approaches.
In the latter case, AO method based on semi-definite relaxation approach is proposed to
solve the optimization problem. By changing the threshold value of the information secrecy
rate, we then characterize the performance tradeoff between passive radar and communica-
tion systems with the boundaries of the SINR-secrecy capacity regions. The performance
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comparison of the proposed optimization methods demonstrate the importance of the semi-
analytical approach and the advantage of overlapping case over non-overlapping one.
Keywords: Secrecy rate, joint passive radar and communications, tradeoff analysis,
semi-analytical approach, semi-definite relaxation
1. Introduction
Radar sensing and wireless communications are the two most prominent techniques that
are based on similar radio frequency phenomena and can be characterized with similar signal
processing techniques [1]. However, a radar system’s typical goal is to detect, localize, and
track targets, whereas the goal of communication systems is to maximize information trans-
fer and enhance its reliability. Due to different objectives, hardware configurations, power
and bandwidth requirements, and frequency bands of operations, these two systems have
been independently considered and developed as two separate entities. However, due to an
ever increasing number of wireless devices and networks as well as demand for high speed
multimedia data services, it is important for the two systems to share common spectrum and
enhance bandwidth utilization via improved spectrum congestion techniques. In this regard,
some frequency spectrum, e.g., 2-4 GHz range, has been allocated for both radar and com-
munication systems, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) [2]. When two systems share the
same frequency band, techniques such as opportunistic spectrum sharing [3], dual-function
radar-communications (DFRC) [4], [5], and cooperation between radar and communication
systems [6], [7] have been proposed to minimize the inter-system interference and enhance
the performance of both systems.
On the other hand, passive radar systems (PRS) have received significant research in-
terests due to their low cost, covertness, and availability of a large number of illumination
sources, such as cellular base stations and television stations [8], [9]. To this end, the authors
of [10]-[12] have proposed several algorithms for detecting, localizing, and tracking targets
in PRS. In [13], the detector based on the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) has
been proposed for PRS consisting of a single transmitter and a single receiver, whereas the
corresponding GLRT detectors for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) PRS have been
developed in [14]-[15]. While these papers assume multi-frequency networks, an extension
to single-frequency multi-static PRS has been proposed in [16].
Recent advancements in PRS (especially in the case of single-frequency multi-static sce-
nario) demonstrate that the estimation of the non-cooperative transmitters’ waveforms is
challenging and significantly affects the performance of the PRS. In particular, the perfor-
mance of the PRS approaches that of active radars [16], if the waveform estimation is suf-
ficiently accurate. Motivated from this fact, the authors in [17] propose to develop PRS as
a part of a bandwidth-flexible communication system [17], where the transmitters no longer
remain completely non-cooperative, and in fact, assist the radar receiver in estimating the
broadcast signals more efficiently through improved resource allocations. The single joint
radar and communications transmitter proposed in [17] is recently extended to a scenario of
multiple transmitters in [18]. However, in both papers, information security is not consid-
ered, each transmitter is equipped with only a single antenna, and the radar and information
signals are transmitted through orthogonal channels (non-overlapping case).
Security in wireless communications is a critical issue, since wireless channels are often
prone to eavesdropping. To this end, based on the seminal work of [19], information theo-
retic physical layer design approaches for enhancing security in wireless systems have been
widely studied in the literature [20]-[22]. Physical layer security approach aims to prevent
unintended users from decoding information transmitted to the intended users by maximiz-
ing information secrecy rate. The advantage of this approach is that secrecy can be achieved
without using an encryption key. On the other hand, information theoretic metrics have
been also used in the design and analysis of radar systems [23], [24]. To this end, the authors
in [25] consider a monostatic MIMO radar system, wherein the objective is to enhance radar
performance and secure information transmitted to a legitimate communication receiver from
an eavesdropper-target. For this purpose, beamforming vectors, applied to communication
and distortion signals, are jointly optimized. A Taylor series approximation approach [26] is
proposed to convexify the non-convex function of secrecy rate. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the problem of designing algorithms for a unified system of passive radar and
communications, while emphasizing information security has not been investigated in the
literature. This problem is important in a unified system since information signals intended
for a communication receiver (CR) may be eavesdropped by a passive radar receiver (RR),
thereby undermining information security. Moreover, in contrast to [25], our objective is
to jointly optimize radar waveforms and covariance matrix of information signals without
additionally transmitting distortion signal.
In this paper, we consider a unified system consisting of a transmitter, a passive
RR, and a CR, each equipped with multiple antennas. The performance tradeoff between
radar and communications is characterized by obtaining the boundaries of the signal-to-
interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) for the RR versus information secrecy rate region, when
considering the same RR as an eavesdropper1. To this end, joint optimization of radar wave-
forms and transmit covariance matrix of information signals is proposed with the objective of
maximizing the SINR at the RR, while ensuring that the information secrecy rate is above
a certain threshold. We formulate the underlying non-convex optimization problems and
provide corresponding solutions when the radar and information signals use both orthogo-
nal and non-orthogonal (overlapping) sets of resources. In both cases, iterative alternating
optimization (AO) methods that employ semi-definite programming (SDP)/semi-definite
relaxation (SDR) are proposed for optimizing radar waveforms and transmit covariance ma-
1In general, information security should be achieved against all eavesdroppers, including the RR. While
such design approach will be reported in our future work, it is worthwhile to mention that the RR’s eaves-
dropping capability is higher than that of any other eavesdropper, since, as a part of the unified system, the
RR has more knowledge about the settings, parameters, and protocols of the unified system.
trices2. However, in the former case, a computationally efficient semi-analytical approach
is also proposed. Simulation results show that this approach provides significant perfor-
mance gains over the SDP-based approach. Moreover, in spite of interference caused in the
overlapping method, due to joint optimization of radar waveforms and transmit covariance
matrix, results show that the overlapping method provides better performance than the
non-overlapping one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the system model
of unified passive radar and communications. Section 3 provides problem formulations and
corresponding solutions for the optimization problems of the non-overlapping case. The
problem formulation and optimization method for the overlapping case are presented in
Section 4. Numerical results are provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and summarizes the key findings.
Notations: Upper (lower) bold face letters will be used for matrices (vectors); (·)H ,
IN , ||·||, and ⊗ denote Hermitian transpose, N × N identity matrix, Euclidean norm for
vector/Frobenius norm for matrix, and Kronecker product operator, respectively. tr(X) and
det(X) denote trace and determinant of a matrix X, respectively, X  0 denotes that X is
a positive semi-definite matrix, and vec(X) denote the vectorization of X. CN×M stands for
a space of complex matrix of dimension N ×M , and NC(µ, σ2) and E{} denote circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 and expectation
operation, respectively.
2These optimization techniques form the basis for solving several problems in other contexts, primarily
in the design of communication only systems (see [22], [27], and references therein). We propose to leverage
these techniques for the joint transmitter design in a unified system of passive radar and communications.
2. System Model
Consider a system that supports both communications and radar receivers, as shown in
Fig. 1. The transmitter and CR are equipped with Nt and M antennas, respectively. The
antennas of the RR are divided into groups of direct channel (DC) antennas and surveillance
channel (SC) antennas. Without loss of generality, we assume that the same, i.e., N antennas
are used for the DC and SC. The DC antennas receive signals via direct path from the trans-
mitter, whereas the SC antennas receive signals originating from the transmitter but reflected
by a target. The direct path signal is used at the RR for estimating the radar waveform as in
the case of PRS. Although the transmitter is not non-cooperative to the RR (in contrast to
the conventional PRS), signal transmissions to the radar and communication receivers may
be scheduled using totally disjoint, partially overlapping, and completely overlapping groups
of resource elements (time-frequency units) [2]. The optimum scheduling of the resource ele-
ments for the transmission of communication signal will change due to channel fading. This
will, in turn, change the scheduling of the resource elements for the transmission of radar
waveforms, since the total available resource is the same in unified system. Moreover, since
it becomes costly for the transmitter to let the RR estimate the transmitted radar waveform
after every change of scheduling, we consider that the RR estimates the radar waveform
using the direct path channel. We consider that the RR can achieve synchronization like the
communication receivers which achieve synchronization by detecting dedicated primary and
secondary synchronization signals [28] transmitted by the transmitter, for example in LTE
systems. As such, no additional communication links between the radar and communication
receivers are required for maintaining synchronization. We also assume a clutter-free noise-
only environment considering that the effect of the clutter-path signals can be mitigated by
applying a variety of techniques (see [14]-[15] and references therein)3.
3 The tradeoff analysis of the unified system in the presence of clutters will be presented in our future
work.
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Figure 1: A unified system with a transmitter, a RR and a CR, all equipped with multiple antennas
The transmitter uses a portion of its total system power, PT , to broadcast the radar
waveform and the remaining portion to transmit an information signal. We consider both
orthogonal and non-orthogonal cases of signal transmissions. In the former, we assume that
the signal transmissions from the transmitter are scheduled optimally using non-overlapping
groups of resource elements. In the latter case, we relax this approximation and consider
that the transmitter broadcasts radar and communication signals using the same resource
elements. The tradeoff analysis is conducted by solving an optimization problem, where the
objective is to maximize the SINR at the RR while ensuring that the information rate for
the CR is above a certain threshold value.
The signal received by the RR, at a time instant l, via direct path channel is expressed
as
xd[l] = γdad(θr)a
H
d (θt)sr[l] + vdr[l], (1)
where θr is the direction of arrival (DoA) of the signal received via the direct path channel
when reference is DC-antennas, and θt is the direction of departure (DoD) of the signal when
reference is transmitter-antennas. ad(θr) ∈ CN×1 and ad(θt) ∈ CNt×1 denote the steering
vectors corresponding to θr and θt, respectively. γd is the channel coefficient of the direct
path channel between the transmitter and RR, and sr[l] ∈ CNt×1 is the radar waveform
transmitted by the transmitter for the lth time instant. vdr[l] ∈ CN×1 denotes additive
Gaussian noise at the DC-antennas of the RR, which is assumed to have zero mean and
covariance of σ2rIN , i.e., NC(0, σ2rIN).
Collecting l = 1, · · · , L vectors of xd[l], we obtain matrix Xd = [xd[1], · · · ,xd[L]] of size
N ×L. Let Sr = [sr[1], · · · , sd[L]] ∈ CNt×L and Vdr = [vdr[1], · · · ,vdr[L]] ∈ CN×L. Then, Xd
can be expressed as
Xd = HdSr +Vdr −→ xd = A(θd)sr + vdr, (2)
where Hd = γdad(θr)a
H
d (θt), xd = vec(Xd) ∈ CLN×1, sr = vec(Sr) ∈ CLNt×1, vdr =
vec(Vdr) ∈ CLN×1, A(θd) = γd
(
IL ⊗
[
ad(θr)a
H
d (θt)
]) ∈ CLN×LNt , and use the fact that
vec(HdSrIL) = (IL ⊗Hd)sr [29].
On the other hand, the received signal vector at the lth time through surveillance channel
can be expressed as
xs[l] = γtas(θr,0)a
H
s (θt,0)sr[l] + vsr[l], (3)
where θr,0 is the DoA of the signal received via the surveillance channel when reference
is SC-antennas, and θt,0 is the DoD of the signal when reference is transmitter-antennas.
as(θr,0) ∈ CN×1 and as(θt,0) ∈ CNt×1 denote steering vectors corresponding to θr,0 and θt,0,
respectively. γt is the channel coefficient of the surveillance channel between the transmitter
and RR and includes the effects of bi-static attenuation from the transmitter to the RR as
well as target’s reflection coefficient. vsr[l] ∈ CN×1 denotes additive Gaussian noise at the
SC-antennas of the RR, which is also assumed to have zero mean and covariance of σ2rIN ,
i.e., NC(0, σ2rIN). Following similar steps as in the derivation of (2) from (1) and collecting
l = 1, · · · , L vectors of xs[l] in a long vector xs, we have
xs = As(θ0)sr + vsr, (4)
where As(θ0) = γt
(
IL ⊗
[
as(θr,0)a
H
s (θt,0)
])
, vsr = vec [vsr[1], · · · ,vsr[L]] ∈ CLN×1, and xs =
vec [xs[1], · · · ,xs[L]] ∈ CLN×1. The RR utilizes the direct path channel to estimate sr by
using matched filtering. As such, the estimated sˆr = A
H(θd)xd can be expressed as
sˆr = A
H(θd)A(θd)sr +A
H(θd)vdr. (5)
Noting that (A⊗B)(C⊗D) = (AC⊗BD) [29], AH(θd)A(θd) can be expressed as
AH(θd)A(θd) = N |γd|2
(
IL ⊗ (ad(θt)aHd (θt))
)
, Ad(θt). (6)
Note that the estimated sˆr may not be noise free. The effect of noisy direct channel into
radar’s performance can be taken into account by considering that this estimated sˆr is the
true sr. Thus, substituting (5) into (4), the received surveillance channel signal can be
expressed as
xs = As(θ0)Ad(θt)sr +As(θ0)A
H(θd)vdr + vsr. (7)
The signal xs can be processed with a linear operator w ∈ CLN×1 which can be considered
as a vectorized form of a spatio-temporal matrix of size N×L. The resulting decision metric
x˜s = w
Hxs can be expressed as
x˜s = w
HAs(θ0)Ad(θt)sr +w
HAs(θ0)A
H(θd)vdr +w
Hvsr. (8)
As such, the SINR at the RR is expressed as
γR =
1
σ2r
|wHAs(θ0)Ad(θt)sr|2
||wHAs(θ0)AH(θd)||2 +wHw . (9)
We assume block fading channel between the transmitter and CR, i.e., the communication
channel remains constant for a block of symbols and changes independently from one block
to another. For conciseness, without loss of generality, this block length is considered to
be L. Since we first consider the case in which signal transmissions to the RR and CR
employ different set of non-overlapping resource units and the communication channel does
not change over L symbols, the information rate for the CR can be obtained by considering
the channel at a specific time instant4. As such, the signal received by the CR can be
expressed as
xc = Hcs¯c + vc, (10)
where Hc ∈ CM×Nt is the MIMO channel between the transmitter and CR, s¯c ∈ CNt×1 is
the vector of data transmitted from Nt antennas at a given time instant, and vc ∈ CM×1
is additive Gaussian noise at the antennas of CR. Each element of vc is assumed to be
distributed as NC(0, σ2c ). Since information intended for the CR will be also received by
the RR, any confidential information can be decoded by the RR, thereby undermining the
security of the communication system. Considering that the direct channel is much stronger
than the surveillance channel, the information received by the RR through the direct path
channel can undermine the security most. Therefore, we mainly focus on the information
signal leaked by the transmitter to the RR through the direct path channel. The received
information signal at the RR is given by
x˜r = Hds¯c + v¯dr, (11)
v¯dr ∈ CN×1 is the additive Gaussian noise at the DC-antennas of the RR. The capacity of
the transmitter-CR channel is given by
Cc = log2
(
det
(
σ−2c HcQcH
H
c + IM
))
, (12)
where Qc = E
{
s¯cs¯
H
c
} ∈ CNt×Nt . The capacity of the transmitter-RR channel is given by
Cr = log2
(
det
(
σ−2r HdQcH
H
d + IN
))
. (13)
The secrecy capacity is given by Cs = max(0, Cc − Cr) [21] , where
Cs = max
(
0, log2
(
det
(
σ−2c HcQcH
H
c + IM
))− log2 (det (σ−2r HdQcHHd + IN))) . (14)
4As it will be clear later in the paper, that this is not true when radar and informations signals occupy
the same set of resources.
3. Proposed Optimization
Given a total system power, PT , the objective is to maximize the received SINR at the
RR while maintaining the secrecy capacity above a certain threshold value. We assume
that the channels from the transmitter to the CR and RR (direct path) can be estimated
with sufficient accuracy using channel acquisition techniques proposed in [30]. Moreover, we
assume that noise powers at all receiver terminals are known. Since these parameters may
not be perfectly known, the performance results presented in this paper will serve as upper
bounds for the performance of the underlying system in practice. The optimization will be
solved for each hypothesized target position (or equivalently range-Doppler cell) and updated
after each coherence time of the communication channel. The secrecy rate threshold is a
user specific parameter and depends on the requested level of security, i.e., usually a larger
value of the threshold is selected for a communication link requiring the higher priority in
information security. Mathematically, the proposed optimization can be expressed as
max
w,sr,Qc0
γR
s.t. Cs ≥ rm, (15)
tr(Qc) + s
H
r sr ≤ PT ,
where rm is the threshold value of information secrecy rate. The constraints of the optimiza-
tion problem (15) do not depend on w. For a given sr, the optimization w.r.t. w can be
expressed as
max
w
wHAs(θ0)Ad(θt)srs
H
r A
H
d (θt)A
H
s (θ0)w
wH [As(θ0)Ad(θt)AHs (θ0) + ILN ]w
= max
w
|sHr Dw|2
wHCw
(16)
where
C , As(θ0)Ad(θt)A
H
s (θ0) + ILN ,
D , AHd (θt)A
H
s (θ0). (17)
This maximization problem in (16) can be equivalently expressed as
min
w
wHCw
s.t. sHr Dw = 1. (18)
Employing Lagrangian multiplier function approach [31], it can be shown that the optimum
w in (18) is
w =
C−1DHsr
sHr DC
−1DHsr
. (19)
Substituting (19) into γR, the resulting SINR can be expressed as
γR =
1
σ2r
sHr DC
−1DHsr. (20)
Without loss of generality, we assume that rm ≥ 0. This means that the constraint Cs ≥ rm
can be cast as Cc−Cr ≥ 0. Substituting (20) into (15), we obtain the following optimization
max
sr,Qc0
sHr DC
−1DHsr
s.t.
{
log2
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
cIM
))− log2 (det (HdQcHHd + σ2rIN))+ ca
}
≥ rm,(21)
tr(Qc) + s
H
r sr ≤ PT ,
where ca = log2 σ
2N
r −log2 σ2Mc and the first constraint is not a function of temporal structure
of sr. Let sr =
√
Prs¯r, where s¯
H
r s¯r = 1 and Pr is the power allocated for the radar waveform.
Then, it is clear that the optimum s¯r is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue
of DC−1DH . In this case, the objective function of (21) can be expressed as
sHr DC
−1DHsr = Prλmax
(
DC−1DH
)
, (22)
where λmax(·) stands for the maximum eigenvalue of a matrix. Note that the SINR at the
RR does not depend on actual Qc, but only on its trace since Pr is a function of tr(Qc).
Substituting (22) into (21), it can be expressed in terms of Pr and Qc as
max
Pr ,Qc0
Pr
s.t.
{
log2
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
c IM
))− log2 (det (HdQcHHd + σ2rIN))+ ca
}
≥ rm,(23)
tr(Qc) + Pr ≤ PT .
It is clear that the optimum Pr is such that Pr = PT − tr(Qc). Substituting Pr in (23), the
remaining optimization in terms of Qc can be expressed as
min
Qc0
tr(Qc)
s.t.
{
log2
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
cIM
))− log2 (det (HdQcHHd + σ2rIN))+ ca
}
≥ rm.(24)
Note that if the optimum Qc is such that tr(Qc) turns out to be larger than PT , then such
solution is not feasible. Moreover, the secrecy rate does not depend on actual sr and only
on its squared norm (power). Unfortunately, the optimization problem (24) is not convex.
Following the approach of maximizing the secrecy capacity under a transmit power constraint
in a MIMO wiretap channel [22], we propose alternating optimization (AO) methods for
solving (24). We first propose an iterative approach wherein an SDP problem is solved in
each iteration. We then propose an AO method where the SDP optimization will be replaced
by a semi-analytical approach that includes bisection method [22], [27].
3.1. Iterative SDP
Since det(A−1) = 1
det(A)
[29], (24) can be expressed as
min
Qc0
tr(Qc)
s.t.
{
log2
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
cIM
))
+ log2
(
det
(
HdQcH
H
d + σ
2
rIN
)−1)
+ ca
}
≥ rm.(25)
We now introduce an additional matrix variable Y ∈ CN×N ,Y  0, and utilize the following
expression [32]:
log
(
det
(
HdQcH
H
d + σ
2
rIN
)−1)
= max
Y0
{
log(det(Y))− tr (Y (HdQcHHd + σ2rIN))+N
}
.(26)
Substituting (26) into (25), we obtain the following optimization problem:
min
Qc0
tr(Qc)
s.t. max
Y0
{
log
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
cIM
))−
tr
(
Y
(
HdQcH
H
d + σ
2
rIN
))
+ log(det(Y)) + N¯
}
≥ r¯m, (27)
where N¯ = ca +N and r¯m = rm log(2). The optimization problem (27) can be solved in an
iterative way as follows. For a given Qc, the optimum Y can be obtained by solving the
first-order derivative of the constraint w.r.t. to Y. This leads to
Y =
(
HdQcH
H
d + σ
2
rIN
)−1
. (28)
On the other hand, for a given Y  0, the optimization over Qc  0 can be expressed as
min
Qc0
tr(Qc)
s.t.
{
log
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
c IM
))− tr (Y (HdQcHHd + σ2rIN))+
log(det(Y)) + N¯
}
≥ r¯m, (29)
This optimization problem is convex and can be solved numerically using convex optimization
toolbox such as discipline convex programming (CVX) [33]. The algorithm (Algorithm 1)
to solve the optimization problem (24) is summarized below.
• 1) Initialize maximum number of iterations, convergence accuracy, ǫ, and initialQc  0.
• 2) Update Y using (28).
• 3) Update Qc by solving (29).
• 4) Go to step (2) until required convergence accuracy is achieved or maximum number
of iterations is reached.
Note that the SDP problem (29) (which is convex optimization problem over Qc ) is solved
for a given Y. In each iteration of the algorithm, Y is updated to approximate the left-
hand side of (26) via maximization of a concave function over Y. This means that in each
iterative step of Algorithm 1, we have an improved estimate of the left-hand side of the
constraint used in the original problem (24). This leads to a decreasing objective function
in each iteration. Moreover, since the objective function is continuously differentiable, and
each variable (i.e, Qc and Y) belongs to a nonempty, closed, and concave subset, the AO
approach is guaranteed to converge [22]. However, in general the execution of the SDP
problems become very slow when they consist of large size matrices. This is evident from
the worst-case complexity of the standard form SDPs, which is given by O (N4.5t log (1ǫ))
[34] for a given solution accuracy of ǫ. As such, the worst-case complexity of Algorithm 1
is larger than O (NitN4.5t log (1ǫ)), where Nit is the number of iterations required to achieve
|tr(Q(n)c )− tr(Q(n−1)c )| ≤ ǫ, where Q(n)c denotes the covariance matrix at the nth iteration.
3.2. Semi-analytical Approach
Motivated from the solution approach of the secrecy rate maximization problem in MIMO
system [22], we propose a semi-analytical approach for solving (29). The Lagrangian multi-
plier function for (29) can be expressed as
L(Qc, λ) = tr(Qc) + λ
{
r¯m − log (det(Y))− N¯ + tr
(
Y
(
HdQcH
H
d + σ
2
rIN
))−
log
(
det
(
HcQcH
H
c + σ
2
c IM
))}
, (30)
where λ ≥ 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. Now the main result is presented in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For a given feasible λ, the optimum solution of Qc, as a function of λ, is
given by
Qc(λ) = P
−H
2 VΛVHP−
1
2 , (31)
where P = INt +λH
H
d YHd, V is a matrix of left singular vectors of HcP
−H
2 , i.e., HcP
−H
2 =
UΣVH, and the non-zero diagonal elements, {µi}ri=1 of Λ, are given by
µi =
[
λ− σ
2
c
d2i
]+
, (32)
where {di}ri=1 are the non-zero diagonal elements of Σ, and r = min(M,Nt).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix.
The remaining step is to calculate the value of λ. The optimum λ is such that it satisfies
the following complementary slackness condition [35]
λ
{
r¯m − log (det(Y))− N¯ + tr
(
Y
(
HdQc(λ)H
H
d + σ
2
rIN
))−
log
(
det
(
HcQc(λ)H
H
c + σ
2
c IM
))}
= 0. (33)
The optimum λ cannot be equal to zero. This is obvious since ∂L(Qc,λ)
∂Qc
= INt , i.e., the partial
derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to Qc cannot be a zero matrix for λ = 0.
As such, the optimum λ is such that
g(λ) ,
{
r¯m − log (det(Y))− N¯ + tr
(
Y
(
HdQc(λ)H
H
d + σ
2
rIN
))−
log
(
det
(
HcQc(λ)H
H
c + σ
2
cIM
))}
= 0. (34)
The value of λ can be found by solving (34). As there exists no closed-form solution for
this equation, λ can be obtained from a general one-dimensional search over λ or more
specifically, the bisection method. Thus, the proposed semi-analytical approach for solving
the optimization problem (24) is summarized below (Algorithm 2).
• 1) Initialize maximum number of iterations, Nit, convergence accuracy, ǫ, and Qc  0
• 2) Update Y using (28)
• 3) Execute the following steps of bisection method to find λ
– a) Initialize λmin and λmax such that g(λmin)g(λmax) < 0
– b) Set λn =
λmin+λmax
2
– c) Calculate Qc(λn) by using (31)
– d) If g(λn)g(λmax) < 0, set λmin = λn, otherwise set λmax = λn
– e) Go to step (b) until convergence of bisection algorithm
• 4) Go to step (2) until required convergence accuracy is achieved or maximum number
of iterations is reached
Note that the steps of bisection method to find λ can be alternatively implemented by using
one-dimensional grid search over λ. Using similar arguments as in the case of Algorithm 1,
the convergence of this algorithm can be guaranteed. For a given Y, the bisection algorithm
is guaranteed to converge, which requires nb = log2
(
λ
(0)
max−λ
(0)
min
ǫ
)
iterations [27], where λ
(0)
max−
λ
(0)
min is the initial interval of λ within which the root of g(λ) lies. Therefore, the computational
complexity ofAlgorithm 2 is given by O (Nitnb), where Nit is the number of outer iterations
(i.e., iterations over Y). Clearly, in contrast to Algorithm 1, the complexity of Algorithm
2 does not increase polynomially (with an exponent of 4.5) in Nt. This makes possible the
execution of Algorithm 2 much faster than Algorithm 1. Moreover, it is worthwhile to
mention that this type of AO methods guarantee suboptimum solutions and, in fact, converge
to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point. This can be proven by following similar derivations
as in the case of MIMO wiretap channels (see Proposition 1, [22] and the references therein).
On the other hand, the global optimization technique, such as branch and bound [36], can
be applied to get the global optimum solution. However, such global optimization method
requires exponential complexity and becomes computationally prohibitive in radar systems
in which L can easily take large values. On the other hand, a rigorous investigation, which
we believe is a significant new task and beyond the scope of this paper, is required for solving
the underlying optimization problems with the global optimization techniques [36].
4. Radar and Communication Transmissions with Same Resources
In this section, we consider that the transmitter sends radar and information signals
using the same set of resources (overlapping case). In this case, both RR and CR observes
a mixture of radar and information signals. Due to this reason, we will find in the sequel
that the optimization problem required for obtaining the optimum tradeoff between radar
and communication systems become further challenging to solve. In this overlapping case,
the transmitted signal vector for the lth time instant can be expressed as
s[l] = sc[l] + sr[l], l = 1, · · · , L, (35)
sc[l] ∈ CNt×1 is the communication signal corresponding to the lth time instant. Replacing
sr[l] by s[l] in (1) and following similar derivations as in (2)-(6), the received signal vector
at the surveillance antennas, x¯s ∈ CLN×1 (i.e, equivalent version of (7)) can be expressed as
x¯s = As(θ0)Ad(θt)(sr + sc) +As(θ0)A
H(θd)vdr + vsr, (36)
where sc = vec [sc[1], · · · , sc[L]] ∈ CLNt×1. After linear processing of the received surveillance
signal with spatio-temporal vector w¯ ∈ CLN×1 , the SINR at the RR is given by
γR =
|w¯HAs(θ0)Ad(θt)sr|2
w¯HC(Qc)w¯
, (37)
where
C(Qc) = As(θ0)Ad(θt)(IL ⊗Qc)AHd (θt)AHs (θ0) + σ2rILN + σ2rAs(θ0)Ad(θt)AHs (θ0). (38)
Considering that the channels remain same during a period of L time instants, the signals
received by the DC-antennas of the RR and CR are, respectively, given by
x¯r = H¯dsc + H¯dsr + vdr,
x¯c = H¯csc + H¯csr + v¯c, (39)
where H¯d = IL ⊗Hd, H¯c = IL ⊗Hc, and v¯c ∈ CLM×1 is zero-mean additive Gaussian noise
with the variance σ2c . Define Rc , H¯csrs
H
r H¯
H
c + σ
2
cILM , Rd , H¯dsrs
H
r H¯
H
d + σ
2
dILN . The
capacities for the transmitter-CR and transmitter-RR, are, respectively given by
C˜c = log2(det
(
ILM + H¯c(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hc R−1c
)
),
C˜d = log2(det
(
ILN + H¯d(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hd R−1d
)
). (40)
The secrecy capacity can be expressed as C˜s = max(0, C˜c− C˜d), where C˜c− C˜d , C¯s can be
expressed as
C¯s = log2(det
(
Rc + H¯c(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hc
)
) + log2(det(R
−1
c )) +
log2(det(Rd))− log2(det
(
Rd + H¯d(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hd
)
). (41)
As in the case where radar and communications signals occupy different resources, our ob-
jective is to optimize SINR at the RR, while ensuring that the secrecy capacity is above a
certain threshold value, r˜m.
max
w¯,sr,Qc0
γ¯R ,
w¯HDHsrs
H
r Dw¯
w¯HC(Qc)w¯
s.t. C˜s ≥ r˜m, (42)
sHr sr + tr(Qc) ≤ PT .
For a given Qc  0 and sr, the objective function in (42) is a function of only w¯. The
optimum w¯ will be similar as in (19) with C replaced by C(Qc). After substituting such
optimum w¯, the objective function in (42) turns to
γ¯R = s
H
r DC(Qc)
−1DHsr. (43)
As such, the optimization problem (42) can be re-expressed as
max
sr ,Qc0
sHr DC(Qc)
−1DHsr
s.t. C˜s ≥ r˜m, (44)
sHr sr + tr(Qc) ≤ PT .
Note that max{sr ,Qc0} γ¯R = max{sr ,Qc0}
[
1 + sHr DC(Qc)
−1DHsr
]
. Since
1 + sHr DC(Qc)
−1DHsr = det(ILN +D
Hsrs
H
r DC(Qc)
−1), (45)
and it can be easily shown that
log
(
det(ILN +D
Hsrs
H
r DC(Qc)
−1)
)
= log
(
det(C(Qc)
−1)
)
+ log
(
det(C(Qc) +D
Hsrs
H
r D)
)
,(46)
the optimization problem (44) is expressed as
max
sr,Qc0
log
(
det(C(Qc) +D
Hsrs
H
r D)
)
+ log
(
det(C(Qc)
−1)
)
s.t.
{
log(det
(
Rc + H¯c(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hc
)
) + log(det(R−1c ))+
log(det(Rd)) + log(det
(
Rd + H¯d(IL ⊗Qc)H¯Hd
)−1
)
}
≥ log(2)r˜m. (47)
Introducing the auxiliary matrices X  0, Y¯  0, and Z  0 and replacing the terms of
the form log(det(A−1)) in a same way as in (26), we can reformulate (47) as the following
optimization problem.
max
sr ,Qc0,X0,Y¯0,Z0
log
(
det(C(Qc) +D
Hsrs
H
r D)
)
+ log(det(X))− tr (XC(Qc)) + LN
s.t.
{
log(det
(
H¯c(srs
H
r + (IL ⊗Qc))H¯Hc + σ2c ILM
)
) + log(det(Y¯))
−tr (Y¯ (H¯d(srsHr + (IL ⊗Qc))H¯Hd + σ2rILN))+ LN
+ log(det
(
H¯dsrs
H
r H¯
H
d + σ
2
rILN
)
) + log(det(Z))
−tr (Z (H¯csrsHr H¯Hc + σ2cILM))+ LM
}
≥ rˆm, (48)
where rˆm = r˜m log(2). We now introduce a new matrix variable S¯r = srs
H
r  0 and relax
rank-one constraint of S¯r. With the relaxation, we can solve the optimization problem (48)
using alternating optimization approach. In particular, for a given S¯r and Qc, the solutions
of X, Y¯, and Z are expressed as
X = [C(Qc)]
−1, Y¯ =
(
H¯d(S¯r + (IL ⊗Qc))H¯Hd + σ2rILN
)−1
,
Z =
(
H¯cS¯rH¯
H
c + σ
2
cILM
)−1
. (49)
On the other hand, for a given {X, Y¯,Z}, the optimization over Sr and Qc is the following
SDR problem:
max
S¯r0,Qc0
log
(
det(C(Qc) +D
HS¯rD)
)− tr (XC(Qc))
s.t.
{
log(det
(
H¯c(S¯r + (IL ⊗Qc))H¯Hc + σ2cILM
)
) + log(det(Y¯))
−tr (Y¯ (H¯d(S¯r + (IL ⊗Qc))H¯Hd + σ2rILN))+ LN
+ log(det
(
H¯dS¯rH¯
H
d + σ
2
rILN
)
) + log(det(Z))
−tr (Z (H¯cS¯rH¯Hc + σ2c ILM))+ LM
}
≥ rˆm. (50)
The relaxed optimization problem (50) can be solved using iterative approach as in the case
of Algorithm1. In each iteration, the convex optimization problem w.r.t. S¯r and Qc is
solved by keeping the auxiliary variables, {X, Y¯,Z}, fixed, and then the convex optimiza-
tion problem w.r.t. auxiliary variables is solved by keeping S¯r and Qc fixed. As such,
this method is an AO method and its convergence can be proven with a similar way as in
Algorithm1. After convergence, if the optimum S¯r is rank-one, then it will also be the
optimum solution of the original problem (48). Otherwise, randomization techniques can be
applied to approximate rank-one solutions from S¯r [27].
In contrast to the optimization problem in orthogonal (non-overlapping) case, the SINR
at the RR as well as secrecy information rate depend on the actual values of S¯r and Qc. This
suggests that the overlapping case provides additional degrees of freedom to maximize the
SINR and satisfy the target secrecy rate. Consequently, although overlapping case causes
interference (to RR from communication signal) and (to CR from radar waveform), better
performance can be obtained through joint optimization of S¯r and Qc. Our numerical simu-
lations of next section also justify this argument. However, this improvement in performance
is achieved with a increased complexity. The reason is that, in contrast to the SDP in non-
overlapping case, problem (50) has an additional matrix variable, S¯r, of size LNt × LNt.
This means that the complexity of the corresponding algorithm increases polynomially in
LNt (in contrast to only Nt in non-overlapping case). It is worthwhile to comment that, in
the non-overlapping case, the secrecy rate does not depend on the radar waveform, sr, (see
(14)) , whereas the radar SINR does not depend on the transmit covariance matrix, Qc, of
information signals (see (20)). However, in the overlapping case, the secrecy rate as well as
the radar SINR depend on both radar waveform and transmit covariance matrix (see (37)
and (41) ).
5. Numerical Results
In this section, we first simulate the performance of the proposed SDP-based (Algo-
rithm 1) and semi-analytical (Algorithm 2) approaches for the case in which the radar
waveforms and information signals occupy orthogonal (non-overlapping) resources. We then
demonstrate the performance of the proposed SDR-based algorithm for the case where the
radar waveforms and information signals occupy the same sets of resources. Throughout
all simulations, we consider that the transmitter, RR, and CR employ uniform linear array
(ULA) with half-wavelength inter-element spacing. We illustrate the performance of the pro-
posed methods by choosing θt = 40
◦, θr = 42
◦, M = N , and PT = 30 W. The hypothesized
target position’s location is such that θt,0 = 30
◦, θr,0 = 32
◦. The average signal-to-noise
ratios (SNR) associated with the direct path and surveillance channels are set to 20 dB
and 10 dB, respectively, whereas that associated with the transmitter-CR channel is set to
0 dB. The elements of the transmitter-CR channel are assumed to be zero-mean complex
i.i.d. Gaussian. All results correspond to averaging over 100 simulation runs, and we take
Nit = 100 and ǫ = 0.01.
The performance of the SDP-based method (Algorithm 1) is shown in Fig. 2 for
different values of Nt, where we set M = N = 4 and L = 10. It can be observed from Fig.
2-Left that the average SINR at the RR starts to decrease when the secrecy rate threshold,
rm, increases. This decrease is, however, significant after rm reaches a certain value and for
smaller values of Nt. Fig. 2-Right plots the achieved average secrecy rate as a function of rm.
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Figure 2: Performance of Algorithm 1 for different Nt: Left - Secrecy rate threshold versus SINR at the
RR, Right - Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
It can be observed from this figure that the achieved average secrecy rate is same as rm for its
smaller values. At larger values of rm, the achieved average secrecy rate drops significantly.
This is due to the fact that the feasibility of the SDP decreases when rm increases. More
specifically, the number of channels, for which the secrecy rate threshold cannot be met,
increases as rm increases.
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Figure 3: Performance of Algorithm 2 for different Nt: Left - Secrecy rate threshold versus SINR at the
RR, Right - Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
Fig. 3 demonstrates the performance of the proposed semi-analytical approach (Algo-
rithm 2) for the same set of parameters as in Fig. 2. Although the achieved SINR at the
RR decreases when rm increases, the decrease in SINR (especially at larger values of rm)
is not rapid as in the SDP-based method. Moreover, Fig. 3-Right shows that the achieved
average secrecy rate is same as rm except at its largest value when Nt = 4. This is due to the
fact that, when rm increases, the feasibility of the semi-analytical approach decreases at a
much smaller rate than the SDP-based method. In a nutshell, by comparing Fig. 3 and Fig.
2, it is clear that the semi-analytical approach provides much better performance than the
SDP based approach. This is a significant advantage since the computational complexity of
the proposed semi-analytical approach is much less than that of the SDP-based method.
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Figure 4: Performance of Algorithm 1 for different M = N and fixed Nt: Left - Secrecy rate threshold
versus SINR at the RR, Right - Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
The performance of the SDP-based method (Algorithm 1) is shown in Fig. 4 for
different values of M = N and the fixed values of Nt = 5 and L = 10. As in Fig. 2, the
performance of the proposed method drops rapidly at larger values of rm and smaller values
of N = M . This can be attributed to the fact that the feasibility of the SDP-based method
decreases at a faster rate when rm takes larger values. However, as shown in Fig. 5 (with
the same setting as in Fig. 4) , the performance drop caused by higher infeasibility of the
SDP-based method can be minimized by using the proposed semi-analytical approach.
In Fig. 6, we compare the performance of the proposed method for the case wherein
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Figure 5: Performance of Algorithm 2 for different M = N and fixed Nt: Left - Secrecy rate threshold
versus SINR at the RR, Right - Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
radar waveforms and information signals occupy same sets of resources (overlapping case).
We take Nt = 2, L = 3, and change M = N in this figure. It can be observed from this
figure that the achieved SINR decreases with the larger values of r˜m and the smaller value
of N = M . Moreover, for the smaller value of N = M , the achieved average secrecy rate is
smaller than the secrecy rate threshold, which suggests that the feasibility of SDR decreases
with decreasing N = M .
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Figure 6: Performance of the overlapping case: Left - Secrecy rate threshold versus SINR at the RR, Right
- Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
The performance between the overlapping and non-overlapping (Algorithm 2) cases is
shown in Fig. 7 for Nt = 2, L = 3, and M = N = 3. It can be observed from this figure
(Left side) that the achieved SINR drops significantly in the non-overlapping case for larger
values of secrecy rate threshold. In particular, for the largest threshold value of 9.1 bpcu,
Algorithm 2 turns out to be infeasible for all channel realizations. On the other hand,
the SINR in the overlapping case remains relatively stable for all values of the secrecy rate
threshold. Moreover, Fig. 7 (Right side) shows that the achieved average secrecy rate in
overlapping case is almost close to the threshold, whereas the average secrecy rate in the non-
overlapping case drops to zero at the largest threshold value of this setting. This shows that
when the radar waveform and covariance matrix of information signals are jointly optimized,
the overlapping case outperforms the non-overlapping case.
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Figure 7: Comparison between overlapping and non-overlapping cases: Left - Secrecy rate threshold versus
SINR at the RR, Right - Secrecy rate threshold vs achieved average secrecy rate
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the performance tradeoff between radar and communications
in a unified system consisting of a transmitter, a passive radar receiver, and a communication
receiver, all equipped with multiple antennas. The tradeoff was characterized by obtaining
the boundaries of the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) for the radar receiver ver-
sus information secrecy rate region. To this end, optimization problems, with the objective
of maximizing the SINR at the radar receiver while ensuring that the information secrecy
rate is above a certain threshold, are formulated when radar and information signals use
both non-overlapping and overlapping sets of resources. In both cases, iterative alternating
optimization methods are proposed for optimizing the radar waveforms and transmit covari-
ance matrices of information signals. However, in the former case, in contrast to the iterative
approach that employs semi-definite programming (SDP), a computationally efficient semi-
analytical approach was also proposed. Simulation results show that this approach provides
significant performance gains over the SDP-based approach. In the latter (overlapping) case,
the optimization problem is non-tractable and challenging. However, it was reformulated as
a semi-definite relaxation problem and solved iteratively under a framework of alternating
optimization methods.
Appendix : Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian multiplier function (30) can be expressed as
L(Qc, λ) = tr(Qc) + λtr
(
HHd YHdQc
)− λ log (det (HcQcHHc + σ2c IM))+
λ
(
r¯m − log (det(Y))− N¯ + σ2rtr(Y)
)
. (51)
For a given λ and Y  0, L(Qc, λ) can be minimized from
min
Qc0
tr
((
INt + λH
H
d YHd
)
Qc
)− λ log (det (HcQcHHc + σ2cIM)) . (52)
Define P , INt + λH
H
d YHd = P
1
2P
H
2 , Qc = Q
1
2
cQ
H
2
c , and Q˜
1
2
c = P
H
2 Q
1
2
c . Substituting these
relations (including Q
1
2
c = P−
H
2 Q˜
1
2
c ) into (52), it can be expressed in terms of Q˜c as
min
Q˜c0
tr
(
Q˜c
)
− λ log
(
det
(
HcP
−H
2 Q˜cP
− 1
2HHc + σ
2
c IM
))
. (53)
Clearly, the minimum of (53) is obtained when det
(
HcP
−H
2 Q˜cP
− 1
2HHc + σ
2
c IM
)
is maxi-
mized, which happens when Hadamard inequality [37] is satisfied with equality. This im-
plies that the optimum Q˜c will be such that HcP
−H
2 Q˜cP
− 1
2HHc + σ
2
cIM turns to a diagonal
matrix. To this end, let the singular value decomposition (SVD) of HcP
−H
2 be given by
HcP
−H
2 = UΣVH , where U and V are M ×M and Nt × Nt unitary matrices and Σ is a
diagonal matrix of elements {di}ri=1, where di > 0 and r = min(M,Nt). Substituting the
SVD of H¯cP
−H
2 into (53), we get
min
Q˜c0
tr
(
Q˜c
)
− λ log
(
det
(
UΣVHQ˜cVΣ
TUH + σ2c IM
))
, (54)
which can be simplified to
min
Q˜c0
tr
(
Q˜c
)
− λ log
(
det
(
ΣVHQ˜cVΣ
T + σ2c IM
))
. (55)
ForVHQ˜cV to be diagonal, Q˜c must be VΛV
H , where Λ = diag(µ1, · · · , µNt). Substitution
of such Q˜c leads to the following equivalent optimization problem
min
{µi}ri=1
r∑
i=1
µi − λ
r∑
i=1
log(µid
2
i + σ
2
c ), (56)
where {µj}Ntj=r+1 = 0 can be chosen without any loss of generality. Solving (56) in terms of
µi, we get
µi =
[
λ− σ
2
c
d2i
]+
, ∀i, (57)
where [x]+ = max(0, x). The proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
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